Şerif KARATAŞ
İstanbul

This week all eyes are on the decision to be taken by the Supreme Election Council (SEC) regarding the Istanbul election. Political Scientist Sezin Öney made the following assessment: “There is neither a mass body that gives credence to the ruling entity and attaches merit to its arguments over the annulment of the Istanbul elections, nor is there an overall change in the trend of electoral behaviour in Istanbul. If anything, there is an observable increase in support for Ekrem İmamoğlu.”

Even though the CHP’s Ekrem İmamoğlu received his certificate of election seventeen days after the election, the controversy over the election in Istanbul has not ended due to the objection made to the SEC by the People’s Alliance members of the AKP and MHP for the annulment of the Istanbul elections.

I spoke to Political Scientist Sezin Öney about the election results and the objections made to the Istanbul election.

Regarding the local election results, Öney responded as follows: “In a most clear manner, important victories are involved as far as the opposition is concerned. The principal locus of victory was most certainly Istanbul. If nothing but the Istanbul election results had been different and there had been no change of power in Istanbul, we would not still be able to speak of a ‘sense of victory.’ Istanbul is for one thing the ‘birthplace’ of the party’s cult leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political story where a very important turning point took place in ‘psychological’ terms as far as the ruling party’s history goes. In these terms, it is the party’s heart, brain and everything. So much so that I think for those currently in the party’s leadership echelons and elite there is even a distinction that puts Istanbul in a different place from the rest of Turkey. Istanbul is for sure a ‘golden apple’ or ‘golden fleece,’ or perhaps couched more appropriately in the ruling coalition’s ideological jargon ‘Kızıl Elma (scarlet apple),’ having on the one hand a psychological and on the other an exceptionally tangible dimension, that is an economic one involving income-expenses calculations.

Of course, bestowing this ‘Kızıl Elma’ status has by now for one thing become an impossible goal, something ideal-like, for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Kurdish voters as a body have a decisive influence in all Turkey’s metropolises, not least Istanbul. And, if for example we look particularly at Istanbul, with the trend to ‘vote as a block’ on the decline among the ‘pious-conservative’ and ‘nationalist’ electoral groups, it is on the rise among Kurdish voters. We witness a gradual decline in the level of Kurdish electoral support for the Justice and Development Party. There is currently no reason for a Kurdish voter to vote for the ruling coalition unless they have special business relations or they have a need, necessity or preference to engage in a 1990’s-style ‘state dependency’ reflex. Conversely, given that the entirety of the nationalist and/or conservative electorate cannot, in the absence of a graft or economic cake of commensurate size, enter into dealings-a direct relationship of clientelism with the ruling coalition, this body may go for other options if they are available.”

“NOBODY GIVES CREDENCE TO THE RULING ENTITY OVER ELECTION ANNULMENT”

Öney had the following assessment of the objection made by the People’s Alliance to the Istanbul elections even though Ekrem İmamoğlu has received his certificate of election: “If the Justice and Development Party had the possibility of ‘repeating,’ more correctly ‘annulling,’ the Istanbul elections, if this was really within it power, we must not have the slightest doubt this is what they would do. The matter of being ‘within their power’ is not simply one of forcible adaption of the legal framework, pressurizing civil servants who ostensibly exercise decision-taking powers or having political clout: If the Istanbul elections are annulled, the economy which in any case to put it mildly is in an ‘unsavoury’ state will become mixed up in this and the ruling entity will become devoid of ‘legitimacy’ on external platforms and in the external world at large. And, of course, in public opinion, looking at the readings there is neither a mass body that gives credence to the ruling entity and attaches merit to its arguments over the annulment of the Istanbul elections, nor is there an overall change in the trend of electoral behaviour in Istanbul. If anything, there is an observable increase in support for Ekrem İmamoğlu. And, of course, İmamoğlu will have been handed the sense of ‘victimhood’ that the ruling entity has until now always drawn succour from.”

“THE HDP HAS PRESERVED ITS EXISTENCE DESPITE THE INTENSE SIEGE” 

Öney responded as follows to my question about the results of the HDP’s electoral strategy of ‘causing reversal to the AKP-MHP in western provinces and taking municipalities to which trustees have been appointed’: “The glass is both empty and full for the HDP: on the one hand it has absolutely preserved its existence-potential vote more or less as it was despite all the blockades and the intense siege and oppression that not just the party itself but its voters also underwent. With the word meaning ‘trustee’ being a notion to which ‘holiness’ is attributed Islamically, it has suddenly now fallen to the ground and turned into a notion that is associated with ‘luxury bathrooms behind official chambers’ and ‘tons of sweet pastry.’ In fact, when you looked at the society magazines in the region as a whole, you saw a section of the trustees adopting grand poses at openings. Now, with their ‘official chambers retaken’ and ‘having been defeated,’ the people in the region are definitely seeing what lay behind the poses in society magazines and how it looked from the inside. As such, over and above the HDP retaking municipalities to which trustees had been appointed, it will not now be very easy to reappoint trustees to these places, because whoever is appointed, for whatever reason and however, will be associated with ‘bathroom’ and ‘sweet pastry’ symbolism.

On the other hand, it may not be correct to interpret the electoral swing to the ruling block in a place like Şırnak purely to ‘installing the security civil service in the region.’ I say of Şırnak that it is a ‘town having an airport but lacking itself.’ But over and above the destruction and demographic change the town has for the one part undergone, other dynamics have certainly emerged. There may be the influence of strong figures regionally with it going through a ‘swing back to the right in the interests of compatibility with the state trend’ redolent of the 1990’s and there may be weariness-subjugation in the base overall. There is a need to interpret these things correctly without denial or judgement. Both the HDP needs to do this from its own standpoint, as do we who are trying to make objective interpretations. However, it is hard to come up with a good quality analysis without making observations on-site. The HDP itself is again best placed to make these analyses. They are the ones who are and should be at the grass roots.”

“YOU CANNOT COPE WITH EVERYTHING IF YOU TRY TO CENTRALIZE” 

Sezin Öney replied as follows to our question as to the foreign policy impact of the local election results, not least Syria: “Parliament has been shut for more or less three months due to the local elections. Actually, its absence is sadly not felt, but a massive void has emerged in politics as a consequence. And ‘localism’ has filled this void. In a sense, we see in an ironic manner the idea of ‘politics moving away from the centre and strengthening locally’ that forever confronts us in relations with European institutions in the European Union membership process being fostered by the ‘presidential system.’ Ankara has turned into such a quantitatively limited political locus consisting of the presidential palace and one actor and those in his entourage at the palace that the local problems and priorities of such a large country and especially the metropolitan cities that are massive centres in their own right cannot be solved from Ankara. This psychology that puts Istanbul in a different place from the rest of Turkey I mentioned at the outset in fact stems from Istanbul being more than Ankara can cope with. If you try to overcentralize everything to this extent, you end up unable to cope with everything; localism fills the ensuing void and you subsequently empty the centre with talk of governing the local. Another peculiarity of the local elections was that I, too, for example, have no way of knowing what Turkey’s foreign policy is. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu functioned far more as a second Interior Minister; more correctly, as an Antalya MP and the ruling party’s Antalya provincial chair. The Syrian issue, as with all other foreign policy issues, is being used to an increasing degree as material predominantly in domestic politics; as to now, it defies placement in either domestic or foreign politics because I do not think there is a staff and political intelligence capable of making a long-term or even short-term strategic plan in this regard. For the time being, thinking does not go beyond the kind of domestic political effect Syria can be used to create; this used to be the case but there were certain ambitions and plans regarding Syria’s future. I now think that Syria, too, and, let me say once more, in a most ironic manner, has turned into a tiny detail of the focus on Istanbul.” 

(Translated by Tim Drayton)