Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DTSO) chairman Mehmet Kaya, said that his recent talks with representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has brought about discussions on whether “a new [peace] solution process” is beginning.
In an interview with İrfan Aktan of Gazeteduvar, Kaya, who is one of the prominent names in the Kurdish capital owning circles, said: “Looking at the current conditions and the impressions we have gained, I can say that we are on the brink of a new [peace] solution process.
“The ways and methods of the previous process may not be identical, but a process is in development (…) [President] Tayyip Erdoğan is a very pragmatist leader and will not continue the current process in a passive position (...)
“Even though his methods, form of administration and road maps are debatable, the government will have to begin a similar process to that of 2013. Is this something that is possible? Yes, certainly.”
Following Kaya’s statement, former member of parliament for the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) Sırrı Sakık said that the party was also hearing reports about a new process in development.
Meetings between the President’s Chief Advisor, Gülşen Orhan, with institutions and organisations in Diyarbakır, including DTSO, are being pointed to as proof of preparations for such a process.
Before discussing whether a new “solution process” can be initiated and what the government understands and wants from this “process”, it will be useful to briefly remind ourselves about the parameters of the previous process which took place between 2013 and 2015.
The AKP-Erdoğan government’s policy in its intervention of the Syria war, which was pioneered by its neo-Ottomanist ambitions and the hopes of claiming “regional leadership”, did not reach the results it had hoped for.
Apart from the failure of the goal of overthrowing the Syrian regime in six months, there was another unexpected development. Kurds had established autonomous cantonal administrations in northern Syria. This situation created the conditions in the summer of 2012 in which the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) could have waged a “frontline war” with the Turkish Armed Forces.
On the other hand, the problems between the AKP-Erdoğan, its ruling partner and the Gülenists - followers of Fethullah Gülen’s islamist sect - made it necessary for Erdoğan and the monopoly bourgeois powers he represented to seek new foundations for his “presidential” goals.
The “solution process” and negotiations with [PKK leader] Abdullah Öcalan had begun under such conditions. In order to gain support from the Kurds on their policy of intervention in Syria, negotiations were held with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and in order to gain support for the building of the presidential regime from Kurds within the Turkish border, discussions were held with Öcalan on the strengthening of local governments and the granting of some cultural rights.
In short, the autonomous administrations in Syria made it impossible for the AKP-Erdoğan government to impose a solution of their own initiative in the country, and the HDP’s attitude and success against the presidential regime in the June 7, 2015 elections ended the “solution process”.
To summarise, contrary to expectations and account of the government, the 2013-15 process resulted in the Kurdish movement and the HDP gaining initiative, and with Turkey becoming increasingly democratised, the tables turned on a solution for the Kurdish problem.
What happened after is well known. The city/“trench” wars took place in 2015-2016. Following this process, during which the cities were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people had to leave their homes, the July 15 coup attempt came.
Following the coup attempt and the declared state of emergency, trustees were appointed to municipalities in Kurdish cities, and thousands of politicians, including party co-chairs, parliamentarians and mayors, were arrested.
In Syria, especially after Russia gave “consent” in line with the aim of violating the plans of the USA and weakening the Kurds, successive operations were carried out against the regions under the Kurdish autonomous administration. As a result of these operations carried out with jihadist groups who were settled in the seized areas, the gains of the Kurds were significantly limited.
It is debatable as to whether a new “process” is possible and if so, what kind of process awaits. Especially in times where Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the government’s de facto partner, claims: “A lock must be place on the doors of HDP, never to open again”, and Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu states: “We are doing the same thing that Spain has done to Batasuna.”
First of all, Mehmet Kaya’s statements show that the “reforms” brought to the agenda as a result of the one-man rule and the way in which it has contributed to economic crisis and political certainty, has led to new expectations in Kurdish capital owning circles. Kaya highlights said expectations with the statement: “Both the policy of incentives and the approach to the Kurdish problem should change.”
Why should President Erdoğan not want the Kurdish capital owning circles to pin their faith on him? Especially during times in which HDP has been subjected to such restraint, and the military operations against the Kurdish movement in Iraq and Syria are continuing unabated.
On the one hand, attempts for the political liquidation of the HDP continue uninterruptedly, and it is desired for them to be replaced by newly established Kurdish political structures in the Barzanian line, such as the KDP.
On the other hand, the proposed “reforms” are aimed to create prospects in the Kurdish capital owning circles and to back such groups into power. As a continuation of these initiatives, it is aimed to prevent the Kurdish conservative circles from separating from the State through the use of religious sects and communities.
Moreover, Erdoğan walking arm in arm with the MHP and Bahçeli does not constitute an obstacle for them as it is widely believed.
On this note, it is important to draw attention to a statement made by Bahçeli: “2021 will be the year of reform. This is our understanding and aspiration.
“We are giving assurance that we will support a reform mobilisation that is compatible with the vision of 2023 in all areas of life, from law to economy, and we will keep that promise to the end.”
The statement shows that the MHP does not seem to object to the “People's Alliance” between it and the AKP. Nor that they object to a “reform” that will strengthen Erdoğan’s one-man regime, or a new “process” that only concerns Kurds from circles will participate in.
For this reason, even if the process that Kaya claims we are on the brisk, of is initiated, it already appears that the initiative is completely in the hands of the government, the HDP/ Kurdish movement will not have any say in it. In other words, it will be run as a process without any addressees.
The Kurdish bourgeoisie may have made use of the crumbs from the “reforms” in which Selahattin Demirtaş, who was arrested while co-chair of the HDP, was branded a “terrorist” - as they will in a new “process” where the HDP / Kurdish movement will be left voiceless.
But the Kurdish people, who struggle for their national-democratic demands and aspirations, have nothing to win from such “reforms”.
Yusuf Karadaş
