AKP’s February 28 pragmatism
When it comes to position, career, and capital, what harm could come from first supporting February 28 and now the AKP and its judiciary against it?
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Fotoğraf: AA
The pragmatism at the core of the AKP's political style is also the defining feature of its relationship with February 28, which is known as a 'post-modern coup'.
Erdogan's current power walk began with his election as İstanbul metropolitan mayor from the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in the March 27, 1994 local elections. When Erdogan's teacher and prime minister Necmettin Erbakan’s RefahYol government was overthrown by the “post-modern coup” of 28 February 1997, the days of Erdogan, who had started a new movement, were paved.
But first, there are a few points to pay attention to. At that time, Hurriyet newspaper made headlines with the words of the naval forces commander, Admiral Guven Erkaya, with the signature of chief editor Ertuğrul Ozkok, “This time, let unarmed forces handle it”, while Fethullah Gulen's statement “Let the government go” was the headline in the Akit newspaper. The media and various other ‘non-military’ actors that Guven Erkaya emphasized when he said ‘unarmed forces’ did what was necessary. While rectors lined up to support the intervention, many institutions, including large capital organisations and the top of the judiciary, supported the intervention.
While Evrensel was making headlines criticising the intervention at that time, it was prosecuted for articles criticising the generals. The author of these very lines is also part of those put on trial.
After Erbakan was overthrown, the era of the AKP, which was established under the leadership of Erdogan, whose path was paved with the rhetoric of ‘innovators’, had begun. In the 2002 elections after the 2001 crisis, as a bill of the crisis the parties previously in power remained below the threshold, and as a result of the failure of the people to recognise an opposition centre to unite around, the polished AKP became the party that the people united around their hopes for a ‘new search’.
Meanwhile, let us remind you that Numan Kurtulmus, who is currently one of the closest people to Erdogan, made the following statement to the Birgun newspaper as HAS party chairman: “If it had not been for September 12, ANAP could not have been established. There would be no Justice and Development Party (AKP – translator’s note) if it were not for February 28, 1997.” (28 February 2012)
The period has come when the AKP shared critical levels of the state with the Gulen community, which after the July 15 coup attempt Erdogan would say “deceived” them, and launched the “Ergenekon” and “Sledgehammer” operations against the generals. This was the period of Erdogan’s efforts to close the gap between being a government and ‘being able to be a state’.
While the AKP government was, in cooperation with the Gulen community, reckoning with the generals, the “Ergenekon” front entered the process of reconciliation during the operations process against the Gulen community, which it began to refer to as “FETO” after the “the grace of god” July 15 coup attempt. This was the new era of political collage, in which Perincek was also in the bunch.
The warning made by retired admirals in a statement based on the Montreux Convention published last year triggered some fears that have always been alive within the AKP government. Now, the sentences and arrest warrants for the February 28 generals stand somewhere in the continuation of the effort to wreak havoc with knells after July 15 and the unrest stemming from the retired admirals’ declaration.
When it comes to position, career, and capital, what harm could come from first supporting February 28 and now the AKP and its judiciary against it?
Among all these, the fact that judicial decisions are tied to the strategy of the dominant power, and that the judiciary of the AKP period is at the disposal of the government's cyclical interests, turns the decisions made into a political procedure.
Just as the sentence of retired Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, commander of the land forces of the 28 February period and then chief of general staff, “February 28 will last for a thousand years” did not last long, who can claim that the days, when even those ‘knells’ will not be enough for the AKP, that marched to power on the path paved by February 28 and is working hard today to maintain its position using the image of reckoning with it, are far away?
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